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17 May 1959

*card*  
Franklin A. Lindsay, Esq.  
McKinsey & Company, Inc.  
60 East 42nd Street  
New York 17, N. Y.

Dear Frank:

I was interested in your letter to the Vice President but I am not sure whether your suggestion does not involve a somewhat difficult mixing of drinks which might result in a souring boat. However, it is worth a thought and it is always good to hear from you.

Faithfully yours,

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

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60 East 42nd Street, New York 17, N.Y.  
Murray Hill 7-3123

May 8, 1959

The Honorable Allen Dulles  
Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Allen:

I am enclosing a copy of my letter to the Vice President with the thought that you might be interested in its contents.

Sincerely,

Franklin A. Lindsay

Enclosure

May 7, 1959

The Honorable Richard M. Nixon  
Vice President of the United States  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dick:

I was delighted to read that you are going to the Soviet Union in July. This visit cannot help but be of substantial value. Let me also, however, suggest that you consider an informal visit to Belgrade on your return from Moscow. It seems to me very important that at the time of the first top-level visit to the Soviet Union, a similar visit be made to Yugoslavia in order to minimize apprehensions, irrational but still important, that our interest in Yugoslavia will be lessened as a result of the Soviet visit. The Yugoslavs will be watching this visit very closely and I can't help but feel your visit to Belgrade would help strengthen their determination to continue to resist Soviet pressures. I think it would also be an important indication to the people of the Eastern European satellites that we are not preparing a deal which would abandon them permanently to the Soviets. Further, I think it would be most useful for Tito to have, directly from you, a frank statement of United States interests in Yugoslavia. I think this is important on two scores. First, so that Tito will not over-estimate his own significance in the world scene and on the other hand, so that he will be fully convinced of our resolve not to make damaging compromises with Moscow, even under the threats of missile warfare.

Sincerely,

Franklin A. Lindsay

FAL:hr

CC: Allen Dulles  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington